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911 
Preventing Divisiveness: The Ninth Circuit Upholds the 
1954 Pledge Amendment in Newdow v. Rio Linda Union 
School District 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In October of 2010, a Mississippi state court judge requested that all 
in his courtroom recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Each person did so—
except an attorney who stood but refused to recite it.1 In response, the 
judge held the attorney in contempt of the court and jailed him for five 
hours.2 The judge’s order was uncompromising: “[the attorney] shall 
purge himself of said criminal contempt by complying with the order of 
this Court by standing and reciting the Pledge of Allegiance in open 
court.”3 Though this is clearly a case of judicial misconduct, this story 
also demonstrates, more importantly, the magnitude of disagreement that 
arises from the recitation of the Pledge. The patriotic, religious, and 
political dimensions heighten its controversy, especially when 
government actors lead its recitation—whether they be judges, public 
school employees, or other officials. 
Such was the case in Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District.4 
The plaintiff, Michael Newdow, challenged the recitation of the Pledge 
in his daughter’s public school classroom because of the words “under 
God.”5 Newdow’s Pledge challenge was just one of his several 
constitutional challenges to the government’s use of the word “God” in 
the public sphere.6 These challenges have included requests for 
injunctive relief enjoining Chief Justice John Roberts’s use of the words 
“So help me God” after administering the presidential oath during 
inaugurations,7 the use of opening prayers in legislative sessions,8 the 
 
 1. Holbrook Mohr, Mississippi Judge Jails Attorney for Not Reciting Pledge, SAN ANGELO 
STANDARD-TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, http://www.gosanangelo.com/news/2010/ oct/07/bc-us--jailed-
over-pledge1st-ld-writethru0317. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. 597 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 5. Id. at 1012. 
 6. See Current Litigation Page, RESTORE OUR PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE, 
http://www.restorethepledge.com/ (last updated June 23, 2011), for the status of Dr. Newdow’s 
ongoing litigation. 
 7. Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
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use of the phrase “In God We Trust” on currency,9 and President Bush’s 
invitation to a clergyman to give a prayer at his presidential 
inauguration.10 Though the subject matter of these challenges has been 
varied, Newdow’s claim was the same in each case: the challenged 
government action violates the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. In Rio Linda, the Ninth Circuit ruled against Newdow, 
upholding the constitutionality of the “under God” language in the 
Pledge.11 It also upheld the constitutionality of a California statute that 
requires school teachers to lead students in a daily patriotic exercise—a 
requirement that the statute suggests is fulfilled by the recitation of the 
Pledge of Allegiance.12  
Although the Ninth Circuit correctly upheld the constitutionality of 
the state Pledge statute, it overreached by ruling on the constitutionality 
of the 1954 Pledge amendment, which added the words “under God.” To 
justify its holding under the Supreme Court’s current tests, the Ninth 
Circuit improperly relied upon the doctrine of ceremonial deism, which 
is an unsuitable rationale for arguing the constitutionality of 
governmental references to deity. As an alternative to the Supreme 
Court’s current tests in this area, this Note will argue that judicial review 
of longstanding government references to deity should be analyzed with 
a legal standard advocated by Justice Breyer, which takes into account 
the divisiveness along religious lines caused by the government’s 
“purg[ing] from the public sphere all that in any way partakes of the 
religious.”13 Although Justice Breyer advanced this rationale in the 
context of government monuments that contain references to deity, this 
Note will argue for its application to all longstanding government 
references to deity. This standard would help avoid “creat[ing] the very 
 
 8. Newdow v. Eagen, 309 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 9. Newdow v. Lefevere, 598 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 10. Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 265 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 11. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 12. Id. The statute reads: 
In every public elementary school each day during the school year at the beginning of the 
first regularly scheduled class or activity period at which the majority of the pupils of the 
school normally begin the schoolday, there shall be conducted appropriate patriotic 
exercises. The giving of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of 
America shall satisfy the requirements of this section. 
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52720 (West 2009). 
 13. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) 
(citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)). 
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kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause 
seeks to avoid.”14  
This divisiveness rationale provides a pragmatic compromise to a 
difficult issue: a monument on government property that includes a 
reference to deity, if it has survived unchallenged for at least forty years, 
is constitutional if tearing it down would create the divisiveness that the 
Establishment Clause seeks to prevent. The same would be true for the 
Pledge and other governmental references to deity: if the tradition has 
survived Establishment Clause review for forty years, it is constitutional 
if its compelled discontinuance would create the divisiveness that the 
Establishment Clause seeks to prevent. New governmental religious 
references, fewer than forty years old, would be analyzed under the 
Supreme Court’s current Establishment Clause tests. 
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II gives further insight into 
Newdow’s Establishment Clause challenge to the 1954 amendment to 
the Pledge. Part III provides context and background regarding the 
Pledge of Allegiance, including relevant Supreme Court cases. Part IV 
explains the Ninth Circuit’s Rio Linda decision. Part V analyzes Rio 
Linda and argues for the application of a divisiveness standard to all 
longstanding governmental references to deity. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Elk Grove: Newdow’s First Constitutional Challenge to the Pledge 
Rio Linda was not Newdow’s first challenge to the Pledge. His first 
challenge to California’s Pledge statute came in Elk Grove Unified 
School District v. Newdow. There, the Ninth Circuit held that 
California’s Pledge statute was unconstitutional.15 However, the 
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that Newdow did not 
have prudential standing because his ability to bring claims on behalf of 
his daughter was questionable.16 By so holding, the Supreme Court 
avoided ruling on the constitutionality of the Pledge.17 
 
 14. Id. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 
U.S. 639, 717–29 (2002)).  
 15. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 490 (9th Cir. 2003) (amending the panel’s 
opinion, which, in fact, made a determination as to the constitutionality of Congress’s 1954 
amendment to the Pledge, which added the words “under God”), rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 16. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 17–18. 
 17. Id. at 18. 
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B. Rio Linda: Newdow’s Second Constitutional Challenge to the Pledge 
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Elk Grove, Newdow 
again brought his claim in a federal district court to challenge the 
constitutionality of the 1954 amendment to the Pledge and the California 
Pledge statute, but this time he was joined by two other sets of plaintiff-
parents whose custody rights did not raise standing concerns.18  Other 
than the newly added plaintiffs, Newdow’s renewed constitutional claim 
in Rio Linda was “almost identical”19 to the case that the Supreme Court 
had recently dismissed in Elk Grove. As was expected in Rio Linda, the 
district court held that Newdow still lacked standing, noting that 
Newdow’s custody arrangement had not changed since the Supreme 
Court decided Elk Grove.20 However, the district court determined that 
the other plaintiff-parents had standing to challenge the state statute on 
behalf of their children.21  
Ultimately, the district court concluded that it was bound by the 
Ninth Circuit’s prior determination that the school district’s Pledge 
recitation policy was unconstitutional.22 The district court reasoned that 
because the Supreme Court had only reversed the Ninth Circuit in Elk 
Grove for prudential standing reasons, the Ninth Circuit’s prior 
determination on the merits of the case was still binding.23 It therefore 
held that the school district’s Pledge policy violated the First 
Amendment.24 The Rio Linda appeal followed. 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part will first provide a brief history of the Pledge, including 
two important Supreme Court cases stemming from its recitation. Next, it 
will address the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause tests, which the 
Court uses to determine whether a government action violates the 
Establishment Clause. This analysis will not attempt a comprehensive 
treatment of those Establishment Clause tests, but it will provide a 
foundation that is necessary for an understanding of Rio Linda. Last, this 
 
 18. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 383 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (E.D. Cal. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Newdow 
v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 19. Id. at 1233. 
 20. Id. at 1239. 
 21. Id. at 1240. 
 22. Id. at 1241. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 1242. 
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Part will summarize three of the Supreme Court’s key decisions that 
guided the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Rio Linda. 
A. The Pledge and the Supreme Court 
1. The Pledge’s authorship and codification 
The original Pledge, authored by Francis Bellamy in 1892, reads: “I 
pledge allegiance to my Flag and to the Republic for which it stands—
one Nation indivisible—with Liberty and Justice for all.”25 It was later 
codified by the U.S. Congress during World War II and slightly modified 
to “I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to 
the Republic for which it stands, one Nation indivisible, with liberty and 
justice for all.”26 In 1954, Congress amended the Pledge to add the 
words “under God,”27 and this is the version that exists today: “I pledge 
allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the 
Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with 
liberty and justice for all.”28 
2. Early Supreme Court cases dealing with the Pledge 
The first court challenge to a public school’s Pledge recitation policy 
occurred before Congress’s 1954 “under God” amendment. In 
Minersville School District v. Gobitis,29 two Jehovah’s Witness school 
children were expelled for refusing to recite the Pledge in public 
school.30 To the students, pledging allegiance to the flag would be a 
violation of scripture, namely:  
Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not 
make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any 
thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth 
beneath, or that is in the water under the earth. Thou 
shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them.31 
 
 25. RICHARD J. ELLIS, TO THE FLAG: THE UNLIKELY HISTORY OF THE PLEDGE OF 
ALLEGIANCE 19 (2005). 
 26. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis 
added). 
  27.  Id. at 1032. 
 28. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). 
 29. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943). 
 30. Id. at 591. 
 31. Id. at 592 n.1 (quoting Exodus 20:3–5 (King James)). 
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The father of the students sued to enjoin the school from forcing the 
students to recite the Pledge.32 The Supreme Court denied relief to the 
children, reversing the trial court and court of appeals.33 In doing so, the 
Court framed its decision in terms of judicial modesty, reasoning that 
granting relief “would in effect make [the Court] the school board for the 
country.”34 Allowing broad discretion in such patriotic exercises, the 
Court noted: “A society which is dedicated to the preservation of these 
ultimate values of civilization may in self-protection utilize the 
educational process for inculcating those almost unconscious feelings 
which bind men together in a comprehending loyalty, whatever may be 
their lesser differences and difficulties.”35 Therefore, under Gobitis, 
school officials could permissibly force students to recite the Pledge.  
However, in a nearly identical case just a few years later, the 
Supreme Court reversed itself in West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette.36 Here, the Court framed much of its rationale around the 
freedom of thought and its accompanying protection of disagreement. 
The Court stated: “[T]he compulsory flag salute and pledge requires 
affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind.”37 It reasoned, “Those 
who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves 
exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves 
only the unanimity of the graveyard.”38 These evils, according to the 
Court, were what the First Amendment was designed to prevent.39 “If 
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein.”40 Thus, Barnette firmly 
established a right not to say the Pledge. 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 600. 
 34. Id. at 598. 
 35. Id. at 600. 
 36. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 37. Id. at 633. 
 38. Id. at 641. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 642. 
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B. The Establishment Clause and the Supreme Court’s Tests 
The First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof . . . .”41 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause seeks to protect the “right to select any religious faith or none at 
all.”42 The Supreme Court has noted that although the Amendment may 
have initially been interpreted as protecting diversity among Christian 
faiths, “today [it is] recognized as guaranteeing religious liberty and 
equality to ‘the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian 
faith such as Islam or Judaism.’”43 To serve these aims, the Supreme 
Court has created three separate tests or frames of analysis to assess 
whether a government action violates the Establishment Clause.  
First, the Lemon test, created by the Supreme Court to “refine” or 
combine Establishment Clause principles found in its earlier precedents, 
focuses on three criteria.44 To survive an Establishment Clause claim 
under the Lemon test, the statute, first, “must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.’”45  
Second, the Supreme Court may analyze a governmental action 
under the endorsement test. Here, the Court invalidates a governmental 
practice if it “either has the purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion.”46 
Additionally, the governmental action is held unconstitutional if its 
purpose or effect favors or promotes religion, “particularly if it has the 
effect of endorsing one religion over another.”47 The doctrine also 
forbids “government from conveying or attempting to convey a message 
that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.”48  
Third, the Supreme Court may also use the coercion test to determine 
the constitutionality of government actions, especially those affecting 
 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 42. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985). 
 43. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989) (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S. at 
52). 
 44. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  
 45. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (citations omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 
664, 674 (1970)). 
 46. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592. 
 47. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578–79). 
 48. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/31/2013 3:51 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
918 
students in secondary and elementary schools. In Lee v. Weisman, the 
Supreme Court reasoned that “the government may no more use social 
pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means.”49 
Therefore, the Court reasoned that a public school may not put its 
students in the position of either participating in a religious exercise or 
protesting it.50 The Lee Court based this reasoning on its observation that 
“adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards 
conformity, and that the influence is strongest in matters of social 
convention.”51 Therefore, the Supreme Court will not uphold any school 
actions that “compel a student to participate in a religious exercise.”52 
C. The Establishment Clause and Public Education 
The Supreme Court has consistently invalidated government-
sponsored religious exercises in public schools. A brief analysis of the 
three following cases will demonstrate this scrutiny and will provide 
context for the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Rio Linda. In the earliest 
Establishment Clause challenge to a school policy, Engel v. Vitale, the 
Supreme Court struck down a school district’s policy mandating daily 
prayer in classes.53 Since that decision, the Court has subsequently 
applied increasing scrutiny to any religious exercises in public schools 
that could be perceived as being sponsored by the government. 
1. Prayer endorsement: Wallace v. Jaffree 
Twenty years after it decided Engel, the Supreme Court struck down 
an Alabama statute that required school teachers to announce a daily 
one-minute moment of silence, which could be used, according to the 
statute, “for meditation or voluntary prayer.”54 Applying the first 
element of the Lemon test, the Court noted that it was “appropriate to ask 
‘whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of 
religion.’”55 Using this analysis, the Court concluded that the statute was 
“not motivated by any clearly secular purpose—indeed, the statute had 
 
 49. 505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992). 
 50. Id. at 593. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 599. 
 53. 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962). 
 54. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985). 
 55. Id. at 56 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 
(1985)). 
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no secular purpose.”56 Noting that the statute said “or voluntary prayer,” 
the Court held that the statute violated the endorsement test because 
those words showed that “the State intended to characterize prayer as a 
favored practice.”57  
2. Prayers at graduation exercises: Lee v. Weisman 
The Supreme Court also invalidated a Rhode Island school practice 
in which principals invited religious leaders from various local 
denominations to give an invocation and benediction at graduations for 
middle schools and high schools.58 The Court noted that it had 
“heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle 
coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.”59 
Further, the “preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and 
worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the private 
sphere.”60 Accordingly, the Court held that the school’s practice of 
allowing prayers at graduation ceremonies unconstitutionally persuaded 
or compelled students to “participate in a religious exercise.”61 
3. Prayer at football games: Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe 
Most recently, the Supreme Court struck down a Santa Fe School 
District policy that allowed students to vote on whether to have an 
invocation at their football and baseball games, and to vote on which 
student should give those invocations for the entire school year.62 The 
Court concluded that this election system placed students with minority 
views “at the mercy of the majority.”63 This program impermissibly 
sponsored a religious message, the Court reasoned, “because it sends the 
ancillary message to members of the audience who are nonadherents 
‘that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and 
an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community.’”64 Accordingly, the Court 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 60. 
 58. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 59. Id. at 592.  
 60. Id. at 589. 
 61. Id. at 599. 
 62. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 297 (2000). 
 63. Id. at 304. 
 64. Id. at 309–10 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1985) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
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concluded that the prayers at football games had the “improper effect of 
coercing those present to participate in an act of religious worship.”65 
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
In Rio Linda, the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the 
California Pledge statute. The court further held that the 1954 
amendment to the Pledge was constitutional.66  
 A. The Court’s Analysis of the Pledge’s History and Purpose 
The Rio Linda majority concluded that the Pledge’s purpose was to 
create national unity through an expression of historical ideals.67 The 
Pledge, according to the majority, is not an expression of religious belief, 
but rather an expression of the Founding Fathers’ beliefs.68 The words, 
“One Nation under God,” according to the majority, are a mere 
“reference to the historical and political underpinnings of our nation.”69 
Therefore, the Pledge is “one of allegiance to our Republic, not of 
allegiance to the God or to any religion.”70 The majority bolstered this 
conclusion by quoting the Supreme Court’s assessment in Elk Grove that 
the Pledge is a “patriotic exercise designed to foster national unity and 
pride.”71 
Notwithstanding this characterization, the court acknowledged the 
“religious connotations” of the Pledge.72 Nevertheless, the majority 
concluded: “Not every mention of God or religion by our government or 
at the government’s direction is a violation of the Establishment 
Clause.”73 The majority cited six cases in which a government’s 
reference to religion or God was upheld by the Supreme Court, 
emphasizing that when those religious references were considered “in 
context, none of the government actions violated the Establishment 
Clause.”74 The majority’s emphasis on context persists throughout its 
 
 65. Id. at 312. 
 66. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 1036 (emphasis added). 
 70. Id. at 1014. 
 71. Id. (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 6 (2004)). 
 72. Id. at 1036. 
 73. Id. at 1013. 
 74. Id. at 1013 (citing Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005); Cnty. of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 670–71 (1984); Marsh v. 
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opinion in an attempt to diminish the religious weight of the words 
“under God.”  
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Application of the Establishment Clause Tests 
The majority opinion analyzed the Pledge under all three of the 
Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause tests. The court’s analysis under 
each test will be addressed in turn.  
1. The Lemon test 
The majority used a sort of two-tiered Lemon approach,75 finding 
that both the California Pledge statute and the federal Pledge itself 
passed the Lemon test.76 California’s Pledge statute reads,  
In every public elementary school each day during the school year at 
the beginning of the first regularly scheduled class or activity period at 
which the majority of the pupils of the school normally begin the 
schoolday, there shall be conducted appropriate patriotic exercises. The 
giving of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of 
America shall satisfy the requirements of this section.77 
In its review of the Pledge statute, the majority noted that the parties had 
agreed that the statute satisfied the requirements of Lemon’s first and 
third elements: it had a secular purpose and did not promote government 
entanglement with religion.78 Next, the majority reasoned that the Pledge 
was merely one way that teachers could fulfill the requirements of the 
statute, since it only requires some sort of a daily patriotic exercise.79 
Because the Pledge constitutes just one activity that would meet the 
requirements of the statute, and because the statute does not mention 
anything religious, the majority concluded that the statute passed the 
second prong of the Lemon test.80 
After it concluded that California’s Pledge statute was constitutional, 
the majority next held that the 1954 amendment to the Pledge was also 
 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784–86 (1983); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970); Everson 
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8–11 (1947)). 
 75.  See supra text accompanying notes 44–45.  
 76. Rio Linda, 597 F.3d at 1017.  
 77. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52720 (West 2009). 
 78. Rio Linda, 597 F.3d at 1018. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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constitutional under the Lemon test.81 The majority’s analysis began with 
the “least controversial”82 second and third prongs of the Lemon test. It 
concluded that the Pledge did not violate the third element of the Lemon 
test because the Pledge did not cause excessive entanglement between 
government and religion.83 Likewise, the majority held that the Pledge 
did not violate the second prong of the Lemon test because the Pledge 
had the “effect of promoting an appreciation of the values and ideals that 
define our nation,” namely “patriotism, pride, and love of country, not of 
divine fulfillment or spiritual enlightenment.”84 
After its brief treatment of the latter two prongs, the majority 
addressed the purpose prong of the Lemon test, to which it devoted the 
bulk of its opinion. Here, the majority emphasized the patriotic context 
of the words “under God.”85 The court supported this reasoning by 
noting that the California statute suggests a recitation of the entire 
Pledge.86 Having thus defined the Pledge as a patriotic exercise, the 
majority used this characterization to distinguish several Supreme Court 
cases holding that religious exercises constituted violations of the 
Establishment Clause.87 Those cases, the majority noted, had “a 
fundamental characteristic absent from the recitation of the Pledge: the 
exercise, observance, classroom lecture, or activity was predominantly 
religious in nature—a prayer, invocation, petition, or a lecture about 
‘creation science.’”88 
The majority further reasoned that the legislative history showed that 
Congress had a secular purpose when it enacted the Pledge.89 The 
majority filled nearly four consecutive pages of its sixty-page opinion 
with a direct quotation from the Pledge’s legislative history.90 In 
addition, the majority reasoned that history itself supports Congress’s 
view of the Pledge, highlighting the role that God played in the lives of 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1018–19. 
 85. Id. at 1019. 
 86. Id. at 1020. 
 87. Id. (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)). 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 1023. 
 90. Id. at 1025–28. 
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the framers of the Constitution.91 Having considered the legislative 
history and the patriotic purpose of the Pledge, the majority concluded 
that the school district’s recitation of the Pledge did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.92 
2. The endorsement test 
Likewise, the majority concluded that the Pledge was constitutional 
under the endorsement test93 because its purpose and effect were “that of 
a predominantly patriotic, not a religious, exercise.”94 As before, the 
majority emphasized the patriotic context of the words “under God,” 
rejecting the dissent’s concentration on the two words alone.95 
Therefore, the majority concluded, the Pledge endorses “our form of 
government, not of religion or any particular sect.”96  
3. The coercion test 
The majority conceded that the district policy coerced97 students into 
listening to the daily Pledge recitation.98 The majority further conceded 
that the Pledge recitation may have induced students to say the Pledge.99 
However, the majority reasoned that despite these concerns, the Pledge 
did not raise the Establishment Clause issues presented in Lee v. 
Weisman, wherein the Supreme Court found a violation because students 
were coerced into listening to a prayer at their graduation.100 The 
majority noted that the Pledge does not coerce students to affirm a belief 
in God.101 It further reasoned that because the Pledge is not a prayer, the 
coercion to participate in that patriotic exercise did not raise 
Establishment Clause concerns.102 The majority explained that Lee’s 
analysis was limited to religious exercises, which is why Lee’s result did 
 
 91. Id. at 1028–31. 
 92. Id. at 1037. 
 93.  See supra text accompanying notes 46–48.  
 94. Rio Linda, 597 F.3d at 1037. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See supra text accompanying notes 49–52.  
 98. Rio Linda, 597 F.3d at 1038. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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not apply.103 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Pledge statute 
did not violate the coercion test.104 
Having concluded that the Pledge statute survived analysis under the 
Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test, the Court held 
that the California Pledge statute was constitutional as it did not violate 
the Establishment Clause.105 It likewise held that the federal Pledge itself 
was constitutional.106 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. The Majority Overreached by Declaring that the Pledge was 
Constitutional 
The majority came to the correct result in Rio Linda, but in doing so, 
it overreached by ruling on the constitutionality of the Pledge itself. The 
first section of this Part will argue that because the plaintiffs had no 
standing to challenge the Pledge of Allegiance, the majority overreached 
by declaring that the Pledge was constitutional. The next section will 
compare the Ninth Circuit’s decision with other decisions by federal 
circuit courts to show that no other circuit court has made such an 
overreaching ruling when called upon to decide the same question 
presented to the Rio Linda court. 
1. No standing to challenge the issue, no reason to rule 
The majority opinion noted that the district court dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ challenge to the Pledge and its 1954 amendment, which added 
the words “under God,” and that the plaintiffs did not cross-appeal the 
district court’s dismissal of those claims.107 Moreover, the majority 
added that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Pledge,108 reasoning that because the Pledge itself 
does not mandate that school children or anyone else say it, the plaintiffs 
failed to show that that the Pledge “causes them to suffer any concrete 
and particularized injury.”109 Despite this, the majority nevertheless 
analyzed and ruled on the Pledge’s constitutionality because, as the court 
 
 103. Id. at 1039.  
 104. Id. at 1040. 
 105. Id. at 1042. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1016. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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noted, California’s statute encourages a recitation of the Pledge. Though 
the dissent noted this logical error,110 the dissent likewise would have 
unnecessarily reached the constitutionality of the 1954 amendment to the 
Pledge on a questionable “as-applied” basis.111 
2. No other circuit court has employed such a broad analysis 
None of the other federal circuit courts, when answering virtually the 
same question presented to the Rio Linda court, have ruled on the 
constitutionality of the 1954 amendment to the Pledge. These courts have 
restricted their analyses and holdings to the state statutes that mandate 
the Pledge’s recitation.  
For example, the Seventh Circuit, the first circuit presented with an 
Establishment Clause challenge to a state Pledge statute, confined its 
analysis to the Illinois statute that required elementary school students to 
recite the Pledge.112 Its analysis included a review of the Illinois 
legislative history surrounding the state statute, rather than a review of 
the federal Pledge’s legislative history.113 The Seventh Circuit concluded 
that the students’ recitation of the Pledge was a mere “ceremonial 
invocation[] of God,” and therefore the statute did not raise 
Establishment Clause concerns.114 The Seventh Circuit also observed  
the Founders’ use of ceremonial invocations of God, noting that 
“Madison, the author of the first amendment, issued presidential 
proclamations of religious fasting and thanksgiving,”115 and that “[t]he 
tradition of thanksgiving proclamations began with President 
Washington, who presided over the constitutional convention.”116 All of 
the court’s analysis refrained from addressing the constitutionality of the 
1954 amendment to the Pledge.  
 
 110. Id. at 1081 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“Has the majority admitted to rendering an 
unconstitutional advisory opinion?”). 
 111. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 112. Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Ill. Rev. 
Stat. ch. 122 ¶ 27-3 (current version at 122 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-3 (West 2011)) (“The 
Pledge of Allegiance shall be recited each school day by pupils in elementary educational 
institutions supported or maintained in whole or in part by public funds.”). 
 113. Id. at 443. 
 114. Id. at 445. As a result of this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit did not apply any of the 
Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause tests. 
 115. Id. at 445–46 (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 100 (1986)). 
 116. Id. at 446. 
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Likewise, the Fourth Circuit confined its review to the Virginia 
Pledge statute in an Establishment Clause challenge to its validity.117 It 
held that the state statute did not violate the Establishment Clause.118 
Much like the Rio Linda court, the Fourth Circuit avoided much of the 
coercion analysis by reasoning that the Pledge recitation is a patriotic 
exercise, noting that “nothing in any of the school prayer cases suggests 
the same analysis applies when the challenged activity is not a religious 
exercise.”119 Finding strong support in national historical references to 
deity, the Fourth Circuit held that the Virginia Pledge statute was 
constitutional.120 Like the Seventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit limited its 
analysis to the state statute, avoiding a broad exploration of the 
legislative history of the 1954 amendment to the Pledge of Allegiance. 
Recently, the First Circuit upheld the constitutionality of New 
Hampshire’s Pledge statute.121 The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
argument that the federal Pledge statute was being applied to them 
because “the statute merely prescribes the text of the Pledge and does not 
command any person to recite it or lead others in its recitation.”122 The 
First Circuit confined its holding to the state Pledge statute because the 
constitutionality of the federal Pledge itself was not at issue on appeal.123 
The court rejected the traditional ceremonial deism reasoning, 
acknowledging that the words “under God” have religious value, noting, 
“[t]hat the phrase has some religious content is demonstrated by the fact 
that those who are religious, as well as those who are not, could 
reasonably be offended by the claim that it does not.”124 
Most notably, the former Ninth Circuit opinion in Newdow, now 
overturned by the Supreme Court in Elk Grove, did not go so far as to 
declare the Pledge’s 1954 amendment unconstitutional.125 Without 
engaging in an analysis of the 1954 Pledge amendment, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that “[t]he school district’s policy here, like the school’s 
action in Lee, places students in the untenable position of choosing 
between participating in an exercise with religious content or 
 
 117. Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 118. Id. at 408. 
 119. Id. at 407. 
 120. Id. at 408. 
 121. Freedom From Religion Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 122. Id. at 5 n.8. 
 123. Id. at 6. 
 124. Id. at 7. 
 125. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 488 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
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protesting.”126 Therefore, despite holding that the school board’s Pledge 
policy was unconstitutional, the prior Ninth Circuit opinion did not go so 
far as to rule on the constitutionality of the 1954 amendment to the 
Pledge. 
B. The Ninth Circuit Inappropriately Used Ceremonial Deism Reasoning 
Though the Rio Linda opinion never uses the phrase “ceremonial 
deism,” its reasoning is very much grounded in the doctrine. Before 
discussing specific examples from the opinion, this Note will explain 
what the ceremonial deism doctrine is and how it has come to be used by 
courts.  
1. A brief history of ceremonial deism 
The doctrine of ceremonial deism was first articulated in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence by Justice Brennan, who described it in his dissent to 
Lynch v. Donnelly.127 He explained that ceremonial references to deity, 
like the one found in the Pledge and in the national motto, are “protected 
from Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost 
through rote repetition any significant religious content.”128 Such 
references, according to Justice Brennan, have perfectly secular 
purposes, including “solemnizing public occasions, or inspiring 
commitment to meet some national challenge in a manner that simply 
could not be fully served in our culture if government were limited to 
purely nonreligious phrases.”129 Justice Brennan reasoned that such 
references have “essentially secular meaning” because they serve secular 
purposes and because they have a part in the nation’s history.130  
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Elk Grove builds upon the 
reasoning of Justice Brennan.131 Speaking of the words “under God” 
added by Congress’s 1954 amendment, O’Connor argued that “[a]ny 
religious freight the words may have been meant to carry originally has 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see generally William Trunk, The 
Scourge of Contextualism: Ceremonial Deism and the Establishment Clause, 49 B.C. L. REV. 571, 
578–83 (2008) (giving a history of the ceremonial deism arguments in Supreme Court precedent and 
arguing that the Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s precedents). 
 128. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 818 (1983)). 
 129. Id. at 717. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 33 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
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long since been lost.”132 Justice O’Connor also attempted to articulate an 
analytical framework for addressing ceremonial deism claims. She 
explained a four-factor test in which the court determines whether a 
practice can survive Establishment Clause review because of ceremonial 
deism based on (1) the history and ubiquity of the practice, (2) the 
“absence of worship or prayer,” (3) the absence of reference to particular 
religion, and (4) whether the disputed practice has minimal religious 
content.133 Concluding that the Pledge constitutes an instance of 
ceremonial deism, Justice O’Connor would have reached the merits in 
Elk Grove and held that the Pledge statute did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.134 
Justice O’Connor also joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring 
opinion, wherein he asserted that the Pledge is constitutional chiefly 
because its tradition, history, and purpose—words that are characteristic 
in ceremonial deism arguments—save it from Establishment Clause 
review.135 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the majority erred in 
not finding standing.136 Chief Justice Rehnquist cited numerous 
occasions in history where public officials have invoked the name of 
deity in the public arena.137 “The phrase ‘under God’ in the Pledge 
seems, as a historical matter, to sum up the attitude of the Nation’s 
leaders, and to manifest itself in many of our public observances.”138 
Therefore, the Pledge, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, is not an 
affirmation of personal belief in God but rather in the Founders’ belief in 
God. 
2. Rio Linda’s ceremonial deism arguments 
The majority in Rio Linda employs reasoning similar to that in the 
Elk Grove concurrences to argue that the Pledge is devoid of any serious 
 
 132. Id. at 41. 
 133. Id. at 37–45. 
 134. Id. at 33. 
 135. Id. at 18 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment). 
 136. Id. at 24. 
 137. Id. at 26–30 (noting George Washington’s 1789 inauguration wherein he opened the 
Bible that he would swear upon to Psalms 121:1 and added “So help me God” after his oath; 
Washington’s issuance of a proclamation designating a day of thanksgiving and prayer; Lincoln’s 
Gettysburg and second inaugural addresses, each mentioning God; Woodrow Wilson’s appeal to 
Congress to declare war against Germany, mentioning God; a mention of God by Presidents 
Roosevelt and Eisenhower; “In God We Trust” on currency; and the court marshal of the Supreme 
Court’s declaration, “God save the United States and this honorable court”). 
 138. Id. at 26. 
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religious meaning. Much like Chief Justice Rehnquist’s observation in 
Elk Grove, the Rio Linda court reasoned that the words “under God” 
were not religious, but were merely “a reference to the historical and 
political underpinnings of our nation.”139 Additionally, according to the 
majority, the words “under God” can be read as “a powerful admission 
by the government of its own limitations.”140 Quoting Justice Brennan, 
the Rio Linda majority reasoned that the words of the Pledge “may 
merely recognize the historical fact that our Nation was believed to have 
been founded ‘under God.’”141  
For the reasons that will follow, this reasoning is inappropriate. 
3. A criticism of ceremonial deism 
The principal problem with ceremonial deism is that it offends the 
very persons that it purports to support—the religious.142 It seems to 
offend, for example, Christian scripture that counsels directly against 
vain repetitions of religious sayings.143 Perhaps this is why the doctrine 
has not garnered the complete support of religious individuals. In the 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion upholding the constitutionality of a state 
pledge statute, the majority’s reliance upon ceremonial deism elicited an 
indignant concurrence, which complained that it was not necessary to 
“totally denude the Pledge by reducing its language to the lowest 
common denominator of ‘ceremonial deism’” in order to uphold the 
 
 139. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1036 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1036–37 (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 304 (Brennan, J., 
concurring)). 
 142. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Unprincipled Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 497, 504 (1996) (calling such characterizations “offensive fictions”). Professor Smith asserts 
that 
it is offensive to all concerned—and, more important, obfuscating and unhelpful—to engage 
in far-fetched, systematic denials of the nation’s (admittedly very ambiguous) religious 
character, as in the now official view that practices such as legislative prayer or the national 
motto “In God We Trust” do not have religious content and significance. Our commitment 
to principled constitutional doctrine, coupled with the particular principles currently in 
vogue, has forced us into a situation where these sorts of disingenuous claims seem almost 
mandatory. 
Id.; see, e.g., Peter Steinfels, Beliefs; Some Believers, Believe It or Not, Are Cringing at the Defense 
of ‘One Nation Under God.’, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2004, at B6 (“And why aren’t more believers 
distressed when language that pretty clearly affirms an existing, active, transcendental God must be 
defended as nothing more than language about what the nation’s framers thought two centuries 
ago?”).  
 143. Matthew 6:7 (King James) (“But when ye pray, use not vain repetitions, as the heathen 
do: for they think that they shall be heard for their much speaking.”). 
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constitutionality of the Pledge.144 Moreover, the concurrence reasoned, 
such a reference does not “become permissible under the First 
Amendment only when it has been repeated so often that it is sapped of 
religious significance.”145  
Ceremonial deism is also met with incredulity by strict separatists 
who stringently oppose any government reference to deity. For example, 
Erwin Chemerinsky, who adamantly advocates for a strictly secular 
government,146 notes a significant discrepancy between the ceremonial 
deism arguments often asserted by religious persons and the actual 
motivations of those religious persons. He observes that when he argued 
against Texas’s Ten Commandments monument in Van Orden v. 
Perry,147 he received “a large amount of what can only be described as 
hate mail” from those who wished to keep the religious symbols on the 
government’s property.148 “Some of it, in its viciousness, was 
shocking.”149 He contrasted the religious motivations in the hate mail 
with what the State of Texas argued before the Supreme Court regarding 
its motivations for keeping the monument: “[T]hat it wanted the Ten 
Commandments monument to remain because of the historical 
importance of the Ten Commandments as a source of law.”150  
Likewise, in Justice Blackmun’s dissent to Lynch v. Donnelly, he 
criticized the majority’s decision because it encouraged the use of a 
religious display in “a setting where Christians feel constrained in 
acknowledging its symbolic meaning . . . .”151 Powerfully, he concluded, 
“Surely, this is a misuse of a sacred symbol.”152  
Lastly, the ceremonial deism justification for religious references to 
deity is problematic because it does not make logical sense. One scholar 
argues that if the words “under God” have no meaning at all, then there 
 
 144. Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 437, 448 (7th Cir. 1992) (Manion, J., 
concurring) (noting that words used in public ceremonies must retain their meaning because if the 
phrase “under God” has lost all of its meaning, so have the rest of the words in the pledge); see also 
Trunk, supra note 127, at 599 (“[W]hy has only the religious part lost meaning?”). 
 145. Sherman, 980 F.2d at 448. 
 146. Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Church and State Should Be Separate, 49 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2193, 2195 (2008) (averring that he agreed to argue Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), 
a Ten Commandments case, because he believes that the government should be secular). 
 147. 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 148. Chemerinsky, supra note 146, at 2193. 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. at 2194. 
 151. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 727 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
 152. Id. 
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is no reason to leave them in the Pledge.153 Furthermore, according to 
the same scholar, Justice O’Connor’s admission that the words are 
unnecessary supports this assertion.154 And if, as the Rio Linda majority 
asserts, “the Pledge is one of allegiance to our Republic, not of allegiance 
to the God or to any religion,”155 certainly the removal of the words 
“under God” would not hinder the Pledge’s patriotic efficacy. Thus, 
efforts to devalue religious references do not support their inclusion in 
the Pledge or in other government declarations. 
For each of these reasons, ceremonial deism justifications supporting 
the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance should be rejected. By 
doing so, religious individuals can be honest about their motivations for 
allowing government officials to refer to deity or for allowing a 
government to maintain religious objects on its property.156 Furthermore, 
religious persons can avoid offending their own moral principles by not 
relegating their sacred symbols to the realm of the meaningless in order 
to argue in favor of their constitutionality.  
D. Courts Should Use the Divisiveness Test to Evaluate the 
Constitutionality of Existing Government References to Deity 
Having argued that ceremonial deism is not a proper justification for 
the Pledge’s constitutionality, this Note proposes, as an alternative to the 
Supreme Court’s current Establishment Clause tests, a standard that 
would allow an acknowledgement of a religious element in existing 
government references to deity. This proposed standard would guide 
courts’ decisions in reviewing the constitutionality of longstanding 
government references to deity, such as the Pledge and existing 
government monuments. The standard was advocated by Justice Breyer 
in his concurrence to Van Orden v. Perry, wherein he advocated for the 
exercise of “legal judgment” in determining whether the government 
action causes religious divisiveness.157 Though this divisiveness 
rationale is not new,158 its application has not yet been used in cases 
 
 153. Trunk, supra note 127, at 599. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 156. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 146 (contrasting religious individuals’ motivations 
with the State of Texas’s posited motivations for maintaining the Ten Commandments monument on 
the Texas State Capitol grounds). 
 157. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). 
 158. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 
1667 (2006) (summarizing the history of the religious divisiveness reasoning in Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence).  
DO NOT DELETE 1/31/2013 3:51 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
932 
analyzing the constitutionality of state Pledge statutes and other 
governmental references to deity. This Note will explain the divisiveness 
rationale and will argue for its application in cases involving state Pledge 
statutes and existing monuments that have religious elements and have 
existed for at least forty years.  
1. Justice Breyer’s divisiveness analysis in Van Orden v. Perry 
In 2005, the Supreme Court issued two seemingly contradictory 
decisions on the same day. The first case upheld the constitutionality of a 
monument containing the Ten Commandments that sat on the grounds of 
the Texas State Capitol,159 but the second held unconstitutional two Ten 
Commandments monuments that were located in state courthouses.160 
Though Justice Breyer joined the majority opinion in McCreary County, 
holding that the Ten Commandments displays were unconstitutional,161 
he concurred in the judgment in Van Orden, upholding the 
constitutionality of the Ten Commandments monument on the grounds 
of the Texas state capitol.162 His analysis of the potential divisiveness 
was the deciding factor in his Van Orden concurrence, and his reasoning 
provides valuable guidance for interpreting future cases involving 
existing government references to deity, such as in the Pledge and in 
monuments. 
In Van Orden, the Court considered whether the Ten 
Commandments monument on the grounds of the Texas state capitol was 
permissible under the Establishment Clause.163 The grounds of the 
capitol are decorated with twenty-one historical markers and seventeen 
monuments, including a six-foot tall monument inscribed with the Ten 
Commandments.164 For six years, the plaintiff, Van Orden, often visited 
the grounds.165 He commenced an Establishment Clause action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 to obtain an injunction requiring the removal of the 
monument.166 The Supreme Court’s plurality opinion affirmed the trial 
 
 159. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681. 
 160. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850, 858 (2005). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). 
 163. Id. at 681 (majority opinion). 
 164. Id. A map of the grounds is included in Justice Breyer’s concurrence. Id. at 706 app. B 
(Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). 
 165. Id. at 681 (majority opinion). 
 166. Id. at 682. 
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court and appeals court, holding that there was no Establishment Clause 
violation.167 
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment.168 His opinion notes that 
because there is no mechanical, easy dividing line between 
establishments and nonestablishments of religion, judges must look to 
the “basic purposes” of the Religion Clauses.169 According to Justice 
Breyer, one of these basic purposes is to avoid divisiveness based upon 
religion.170 To serve this purpose, Justice Breyer notes, “The government 
must avoid excessive interference with, or promotion of, religion.”171 
However, Breyer rejects an Establishment Clause “absolutism” that 
would “compel the government to purge from the public sphere all that 
in any way partakes of the religious.”172 To do so, according to Breyer, 
is inconsistent with American tradition, and “would also tend to promote 
the kind of social conflict the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”173 
As this Note will also advocate, Breyer asserts that there is “no test-
related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.”174 In exercising 
this legal judgment, a judge uses the Court’s current Establishment 
Clause tests only as guideposts, “remain[ing] faithful to the underlying 
purposes of the [Religion] Clauses,” and “tak[ing] account of context and 
consequences measured in light of those purposes.”175 
Applying this legal judgment standard, Justice Breyer concluded that 
the context of the Ten Commandments monument suggests that its 
predominant purpose was to convey a secular, moral message, although 
 
 167. Id. at 683. 
 168. Id. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). 
 169. Id.  
 170. Id.; see also Philip C. Aka, Assessing the Constitutionality of President George W. 
Bush’s Faith-Based Initiatives, 9 J.L. SOC’Y 53, 66 (2008) (noting that “political divisiveness and 
fragmentation along religious lines” was one of the main problems that the Establishment Clause 
was intended to prevent (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668, 695 (1970); McCreary 
Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859–60 (2005))). 
 171. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Cnty. of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593–94 (1989); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 723–
25 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
 172. Id. (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)). 
 173. Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668, 672–78 (1984)); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 866 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“And what of law’s concern to diminish and peacefully 
settle conflict among the Nation’s people?”). 
 174. Van Orden,  545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added) 
(citing Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring)). 
 175. Id. 
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the monument’s contents include a religious message.176 Not relying 
upon a “literal application of any particular test,” Justice Breyer 
concluded that the Texas monument did not infringe upon the 
Establishment Clause.177 To rule otherwise would, according to Justice 
Breyer, “lead the law to exhibit a hostility toward religion that has no 
place in our Establishment Clause traditions.”178 Additionally, finding a 
violation might “create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness 
that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid” because it would 
encourage challenges to existing Ten Commandments monuments in 
public buildings nationwide.179  
According to Justice Breyer, the monument was not that divisive 
because it had stood unchallenged for nearly forty years.180 He suggests 
that a newly constructed monument would likely run afoul of his “legal 
judgment” because it would be more divisive. “[A] more contemporary 
state effort to focus attention upon a religious text is certainly likely to 
prove divisive in a way that this longstanding, pre-existing monument 
has not.”181 
2. Justice Breyer’s legal judgment standard and similar arguments 
Justice Breyer is not alone in his rejection of the Court’s 
Establishment Clause tests in favor of the exercise of legal judgment.182 
For example, Steven D. Smith has argued that “there is not and cannot be 
any satisfactory theory or principle of religious freedom.”183 Professor 
Smith argues in favor of a prudential approach to Establishment Cause 
review, as opposed to what he characterizes as the Supreme Court’s 
principle-driven jurisprudence.184 Likewise, Justice Breyer uses identical 
 
 176. Id. at 702. 
 177. Id. at 703–04. 
 178. Id. at 704. 
 179. Id. (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717–29 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting)).  
 180. Id. at 704. 
 181. Id. at 703. 
 182. Id. at 700 (arguing for the exercise of “legal judgment” rather than the Court’s 
Establishment Clause tests when deciding “difficult borderline cases”). 
 183. STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, at v (1991) (“Virtually no one is happy with the Supreme 
Court’s doctrines and decisions in this area or with its explanations of those doctrines and 
decisions.”); see also Andrew Koppelman, No Expressly Religious Orthodoxy: A Response to Steven 
D. Smith, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 729, 729 (2003) (quoting and agreeing with Smith that nearly 
everyone is dissatisfied with the Supreme Court’s Religion Clause doctrines). 
 184. Smith, supra note 142, at 499. 
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language to characterize his own jurisprudence: “I belong to a tradition 
of judges who approach the law with prudence and pragmatism.”185  
These ideas are born out of a dissatisfaction with the Court’s current 
tests. Professor Smith asserts that the Supreme Court’s attempts in the 
past fifty years to develop and follow a principled approach have been 
mistaken.186 Such attempts, according to Smith, are futile:  
If after half-a-century of fairly intensive research and thinking no 
consensus about the proper principle of religious freedom has emerged, 
but instead every principle proposed by scholars or judges has met with 
serious objections from other scholars and judges, we might begin to 
suspect that the quest for a satisfactory constitutional principle of 
religious freedom is misguided.187  
For this reason, Smith advocates an unprincipled approach to 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, one that he characterizes as being 
on a “largely ad hoc basis.”188 
Smith’s advocacy for an unprincipled approach to the Establishment 
Clause seems to mirror Breyer’s approach, in that Smith seeks to avoid 
divisiveness caused by overzealous adherence to principle. According to 
Smith, converting religious liberty interests into issues of principle has 
not furthered the goal of promoting civil peace and avoiding alienation, 
since “if you believe there is a ‘true’ constitutional principle of religious 
freedom, then you may also believe that we must enforce that principle 
regardless of the turmoil and alienation that this course may entail.”189 
These same considerations motivated Justice Breyer’s divisiveness 
reasoning in Van Orden, wherein Justice Breyer avoided the rigid 
 
 185. Jeffrey Toobin, Without a Paddle: Can Stephen Breyer Save the Obama Agenda in the 
Supreme Court? NEW YORKER, Sept. 27, 2010, at 38 (emphasis added) (quoting Justice Breyer in a 
personal interview) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Breyer’s continued characterization 
of his legal philosophy provides additional insight into his Van Orden opinion: “That tradition [of 
prudence and pragmatism] is not subjective, and that tradition is not politics. It is a tradition that tries 
to understand the values and purposes underlying the Constitution and the laws. It’s a tradition that 
says there’s a need to maintain stability in the law, without freezing the law . . . .” Id. (quoting 
Justice Breyer in a personal interview) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 186. Smith, supra note 142, at 497. 
 187. Id. at 499. 
 188. Steven D. Smith, Our Agnostic Constitution, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120, 166 n.172 (2008) 
(citing Smith, supra note 142). 
 189. Smith, supra note 142, at 501; see also Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged 
by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care? 60 STAN. L. REV. 155, 156–57 (2007) (speculating that the 
Supreme Court’s refusal to reach the merits in Elk Grove was out of a fear that its ruling would 
provoke public outrage). 
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application of the Court’s Establishment Clause tests because to do so 
would have exhibited hostility to religion.190 
3. Justice Breyer’s legal judgment of divisiveness applied to the facts of 
Rio Linda 
Justice Breyer’s arguments for the exercise of legal judgment 
provides a valuable framework for future cases involving Establishment 
Clause challenges to governmental references to deity. Justice Breyer’s 
preference for exercising legal judgment combined with his attention to 
divisiveness, when properly applied to the Rio Linda case, provides an 
example of how Justice Breyer’s approach may help judges in 
subsequent cases to reach the right result. Such an approach does not 
require parties to resort to ceremonial deism rationales or other 
questionable justifications for advocating the constitutionality of 
government references to deity in the Pledge and in existing monuments.  
For example, in the facts of Rio Linda, a judge exercising Justice 
Breyer’s legal judgment standard would take into account the basic 
purposes of the First Amendment, including avoiding divisiveness along 
religious lines.191 Using the existing Establishment Clause tests as 
guideposts, a judge would examine the context and the consequences of 
the Pledge recitation to see if the government was causing divisiveness 
based upon religion.192 Like the monument in Van Orden, the Pledge 
predominantly conveys a secular message but includes a religious 
element, suggesting that it would pass Justice Breyer’s legal judgment 
standard. Furthermore, the Pledge’s religious content has survived 
Establishment Clause review for more than forty years, longer than the 
Ten Commandments monument had sat upon the grounds of the Texas 
capitol in Van Orden. The Pledge’s age suggests that its inclusion in 
schools has not been extremely divisive along religious lines.  
To find a violation under the facts of Rio Linda would certainly 
“create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the 
Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”193 The Pledge, as it is currently 
written, is highly valued by many people.194 To many religious 
 
 190. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment); see 
also supra text accompanying notes 168–81.  
 191. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). 
 192. Id. at 700. 
 193. Id. at 704 (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717–29 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in judgment)). 
 194. See, e.g., Evelyn Nieves, Judges Ban Pledge of Allegiance from Schools, Citing ‘Under 
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adherents, the acknowledgement in the Pledge that their nation is “under 
God” is of profound importance.195 A judge exercising the legal 
judgment espoused by Justice Breyer would take into account the 
divisiveness among religious lines that would be created by a ruling that 
the Pledge is unconstitutional. Therefore, a court employing Justice 
Breyer’s legal judgment methodology would likely come to the same 
result reached by each federal circuit court referenced above, but would 
do so without relying upon reasoning that denies the deeply religious 
meaning of the words “under God.” 
4. The legal judgment of the divisiveness standard: prudent and 
pragmatic 
The approach advocated by this Note provides a pragmatic approach 
to difficult cases: government references to deity, in declarations and 
monuments that have been in place for more than forty years,196 are 
analyzed under Breyer’s legal judgment standard for divisiveness. 
Government cannot construct new monuments containing religious 
elements or standardize new references to deity.197 Therefore, old 
monuments and governmental references to deity would likely be 
permitted so as to further the First Amendment’s purpose of preventing 
divisiveness along religious lines. For example, the Supreme Court 
marshal’s proclamation, “God save the United States and this Honorable 
Court,”198 would likely survive under this test. But new references would 
 
God,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 27, 2002, at A1 (reporting on the aftermath of the Ninth Circuit’s 2002 
ruling that the Pledge violated the Establishment Clause, including the “protest across the political 
spectrum” and the “immediate reaction in Washington, where senators unanimously passed a 
resolution condemning the ruling”); Jimmie E. Gates, Judge Admits He Violated Rights, THE 
CLARION LEDGER, Dec. 2, 2010, at B1 (reporting on an attorney who was held in contempt and 
jailed because of his refusal to say the Pledge of Allegiance in court). 
 195. See, e.g., Nieves, supra note 194 (noting the harsh, swift response to the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision holding that the Pledge was unconstitutional, including the most “vehement reactions” from 
conservative religious groups). 
 196. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682. Justice Breyer found it persuasive that the Ten 
Commandments monument in this case had survived unchallenged for forty years. This Note adopts 
this age as a bright-line compromise. Id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). Such line-
drawing is not unheard of in the Court’s precedents. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) 
(expressing an expectation that the racial preferences condoned by the Court’s opinion would be 
unnecessary in twenty-five years); Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1817 (2010) (noting that 
“[t]ime also has played its role” in its constitutional analysis of a cross constructed on federal land). 
 197. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (“[A] more 
contemporary state effort to focus attention upon a religious text is certainly likely to prove divisive 
in a way that this longstanding, pre-existing monument has not.”). 
 198. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 632 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring 
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fail this test, since this would also serve the First Amendment’s purpose 
of preventing religious divisiveness. Thus, religious individuals would 
not lose deeply important, longstanding monuments and other references 
to deity, but strict separatists could be confident that no new deific 
references would pass this test. 
Such a pragmatic approach would not be new or radical. Suzanna 
Sherry, for example, argues that the Rehnquist Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence was “quintessentially pragmati[c].”199 She writes, “Not 
every constitutional case requires recourse to first principles, and indeed, 
most require more subtlety than such recourse can produce. The 
Rehnquist Court’s free-speech cases provide an example of the benefits 
of a more nuanced and pragmatist approach in the context of a mature 
jurisprudence.”200 
Moreover, an ad-hoc approach to cases involving old government 
monuments and references to deity would not be entirely new to the 
Supreme Court. Professor Kyle Duncan suggests that, despite the Court’s 
seemingly objective Establishment Clause tests, the results have been 
subjective, although the cases are worded in the tests’ terms. “Applying 
even sophisticated rules to such situations has not led the Court 
consistently toward nonsubjective solutions, but rather has invited 
various justices simply to reformulate church-state problems in the rule’s 
terms.”201 Duncan asserts that the Supreme Court has created “spiraling 
confusion in its jurisprudence” by attempting to “erect complex rules that 
ostensibly balance the various competing interests and policies in these 
conflicts.”202 Likewise, Professor Brett Scharffs has noted with 
agreement criticisms that the Court’s religious liberty jurisprudence is 
“confusing and chaotic.”203 This confusion is evident in the above 
 
in judgment). 
 199. Suzanna Sherry, Hard Cases Make Good Judges, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 3, 4. But see Eugene 
Volokh, Pragmatism vs. Ideology in Free Speech Cases, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 33, 36 (responding to 
Sherry and arguing that “under any but the broadest (and least useful) definitions of pragmatism, the 
majority of these cases are indeed decisions about matters of ‘principle’”). 
 200. Sherry, supra note 199, at 30–31. 
 201. Kyle Duncan, Subsidiarity and Religious Establishments in the United States 
Constitution, 52 VILL. L. REV. 67, 128 (2007). 
 202. Id. at 128–29. 
 203. Brett G. Scharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1217, 1224 
(citing MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 247 (1988); Stuart Buck, The Nineteenth-Century Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 
6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 399, 400 (2002); Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality, Separation and 
Accommodation: Tensions in American First Amendment Doctrine, in LAW AND RELIGION 63, 64 
(Rex J. Adhar ed., 2000)). 
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decisions of the four circuit courts that have heard constitutional 
challenges to state Pledge statutes, since each employed widely different 
reasoning and applied the tests differently.204 
Given the Court’s “confused and chaotic”205 precedent in this area, 
adopting a legal judgment standard would give greater freedom to judges 
to apply the non-divisiveness principle of the First Amendment without 
being constrained by the tests articulated by the Supreme Court. This 
Note does not advocate the abandonment of the Court’s Establishment 
Clause tests in all instances, but rather advocates allowing judges to 
exercise their legal judgment in a narrow area of cases—those cases that 
involve government monuments that include references to deity, forty 
years and older, and existing government declarations or practices that 
include references to deity, such as the Pledge of Allegiance. Such a 
small deviation would help alleviate religious divisiveness but would not 
be so drastic as to completely abandon fidelity to the Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
5. Criticisms of the legal judgment standard 
This legal judgment standard of divisiveness has not been without its 
critics.206 However, most criticisms of the legal judgment standard are 
directed at its use in all Establishment Clause cases. This Note argues for 
its application only in narrow circumstances where the court reviews the 
constitutionality of longstanding government references to deity. 
Moreover, despite these criticisms, the Court has used divisiveness 
reasoning in past decisions,207 and it continues to do so.208 If Justice 
 
 204. Freedom From Religion Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010); 
Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying the Lemon, 
endorsement, and coercion tests in upholding the constitutionality of the state Pledge statute); Myers 
v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Schs., 418 F.3d 395, 407 (4th Cir. 2005) (resting much of its decision on 
dicta by the United Supreme Court suggesting that the Pledge is constitutional and declining to apply 
specific tests because the pledge is a “patriotic exercise”); Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 
980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying none of the Establishment Clause tests because the 
Pledge is a “ceremonial invocation[] of God”). 
 205. Scharffs, supra note 203, at 1224. 
 206. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Orden v. Perry, 14 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (2005); Garnett, supra note 158; Edward McGlynn Gaffney Jr., 
Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and 
Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 205 (1980) (criticizing the divisiveness rationale in general). 
 207. Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha, Contract, and the First 
Amendment, 51 MD. L. REV. 312, 389 n.336 (1992). See also Garnett, supra note 158, for a history 
of the divisiveness rationale in the Supreme Court’s precedent. 
 208. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1817 (2010) (plurality opinion) (quoting the 
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Kennedy’s recent plurality opinion, which favorably quotes the 
divisiveness language from Van Orden,209  is any indication, it is likely 
that the reasoning will continue to find a place in the Court’s future 
Establishment Clause decisions.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the legal standard applied, the Ninth Circuit did not 
need to rule on the constitutionality of the 1954 amendment to the 
Pledge. Had the Rio Linda court been able to apply this Note’s proposed 
test, the court likely would have come to the same conclusion, but could 
have done so without resorting to ceremonial deism arguments.  
The divisiveness standard advocated by this Note seeks to develop a 
solution to the strong and sometimes emotional disagreements about the 
acceptability of governmental references to deity. For many individuals, 
judicial removal of such references is hurtful on both a religious and 
political level. Contrariwise, strict separatists have valid and compelling 
arguments against such references. This Note’s proposed standard 
constitutes a compromise between both of these interests: no new 
government references to deity, but no judicial removal of longstanding 
references to deity in government monuments and no judicial 
prohibitions on longstanding government references to deity. Unlike the 
Supreme Court’s current Establishment Clause jurisprudence, this 
compromise adequately considers the divisiveness that is created when 
courts hold that nearly every government reference to deity is 
unconstitutional. 
Devin Snow

  
 
 
 
divisiveness language from Van Orden and noting the disrespect to fallen soldiers that would be 
caused by removing a cross located on federal land). Compare Chemerinsky, supra note 206, at 14–
15 (“The passage of time cannot justify a government action that violates the Constitution; there is 
no statute of limitations for Establishment Clause claims.”), with Salazar, 130 S.Ct. at 1817 
(plurality opinion) (“Time also has played its role.”). 
 209.  Salazar, 130 S.Ct. at 1817. 
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